Policy makers have often argued that an additional benefit of facilitating early retirement is that it creates employment for the young. This may happen if older and younger workers are substitutes.
Introduction
Social security programs create disincentives for continued work at older ages in many OECD countries (Gruber and Wise, 2004) . During the 1980s and early 1990s increasingly more generous early retirement schemes were in place and, arguably, attributed to the falling male employment rates for the older population. Figure 1 shows that for many OECD countries the employment rate of older men fell until the mid-nineties and then started increasing again. Figure 2 shows that over the same period the employment rate for older women shows a different pattern, presumably reflecting a cohort effect whereby more recent cohorts have a higher participation rate than the older cohorts.
Policy makers have often argued that an additional benefit of facilitating early retirement is that it creates employment for the young. Older people who retire and leave the labor force release jobs for younger people. This has been a very popular argument in the 1970s and 1980 when youth unemployment was rising (see Figure 3 ). The validity of this argument is mainly based on the two assumptions that older and younger workers are substitutes and that there is a fixed amount of work to be done in the economy, which is not affected by older workers leaving the labor force.
Economic theory suggests that this latter assumption is a very special assumption indeed and it is thus often referred to as the lump of labor fallacy.
1 Wage rates may increase when, for instance, the demand for younger workers increases or early retirement schemes are financed through payroll taxes (see, e.g., Van Dalen and Henkens, 2002) . This, in turn, will reduce the total demand for labor and the effect of early retirement on employment may be negative even when older and younger workers are substitutes. Concerning the former assumption economic theory suggests that the more similar the age groups are with respect to skills, the greater is the degree of substitution. Some previous studies have identified significant substitutability between workers of different ages but with a considerable variation in the degree of substitution (see Hamermesh, 1993 , Table 3 .9, for an overview). Also, for instance, Card and Lemieux (2001) and Fitzenberger and Kohn (2004) estimate, based on the work of Sato (1967) , a structural model using a CES production function and find that workers of different age are imperfect substitutes, while Hebbink (1993) reports a negative elasticity of substitution which suggests that older and younger workers are complements. In line with Hamermesh (2001) one has to conclude that the empirical 1 Empirical evidence suggests that worksharing policies during the 1980s and 1990s were a rather ineffective instrument for reducing unemployment as it resulted in higher real wage rates and, consequently, reduced total employment (see Kapteyn, Kalwij and Zaidi, 2004 ).
3 evidence is rather inconclusive concerning the degree of substitution and, furthermore, there is no empirical evidence on the degree of substitution between the groups of workers that our paper is interested in, namely between the potential early retirees age 55 to 64 (the older workers) and the younger workers age 15 to 24.
Nowadays policy makers' goals seem to have come around 180 degrees, showing an increasing emphasis on discouraging early retirement to counter the economic consequences of an aging population. In many OECD countries social security programs are being redesigned to create stronger incentives for continued work at older ages. This may in part explain the rise in employment rates of older men during the second half of the 1990s in many OECD countries (see Figure 1 ). Interestingly, now that the goal is to raise labor force participation of older people concerns about the employment consequences for the young do not seem to play a role. Yet, and due to the inconclusive empirical evidence on this issue, it seems worthwhile to study the nexus between employment of older and younger workers in more depth, if only to put any concerns for adverse effects of later retirement to rest. As discussed above, the assumption that older and younger workers are substitutes is a necessary condition for job creation for the young by promoting early retirement for the old but it is not a sufficient condition since the total amount of work to be done in the economy may be affected as well. As we will show in this paper, there is no empirical support for the assumption that younger and older workers are substitutes. If anything, there is some evidence that they are complements.
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The data
For 22 OECD countries we have collected annual data on employment rates of young, prime age and older persons, real wage rates, gross domestic product per capita, consumer price indices, the shares of female employment in total employment, average hours of work per week, and the age The panel is unbalanced and Table 1 shows the years of observation for each country.
We distinguish three age groups. The young age group is defined as individuals aged 16 to 24
(both years included), the prime age people are defined as individuals aged 25 to 54, and the older people are defined as individuals aged 55 to 64. We define age group specific employment rates as employment in persons in an age group over the population aged 15 to 64 (both years included), the wage rate as the average real hourly wage rate and working hours as the average actual hours worked per week. In the empirical analysis a logarithmic specification together with the country-specific effects will control for differences in purchasing power and the fact we use wage rate indices rather than real wage rates.
The figures A1-A7 in the Appendix show the time series of the variables for the 22 countries used in the empirical analysis. Tests for panel unit roots show that most univariate series are nonstationary and that all series in first differences are stationary.
7 
Model Specification and Estimation Results

A Dynamic Model of Employment
The basis of our empirical approach is a dynamic model of labor demand (e.g., Hamermesh, 1993 ). Such a model has been used to estimate dynamic complementarities and substitutions between employment, capital and hours of work, and the speed of adjustment on the labor market (e.g., Hamermesh, 1993; Tables 7.4 and 7.8 
where Ф is a (3xk)-matrix with the parameters of interest, α c is (3x1)-vector with country specific intercepts, and u ct is a vector of random error terms. Changes in demand and supply factors do not immediately yield a new equilibrium and partial adjustment is assumed (2) ( )
Γ is a matrix with adjustment coefficients. Substituting equation (1) and I is the identity matrix. The long run relationship between employment and the labor demand and supply factors is given by the matrix Ф. Labor market rigidities, for instance, may cause the diagonal elements of the matrix Λ to be greater than 0. The off-diagonal elements of the matrix Λ indicate whether or not the inputs are complements (a positive sign) or substitutes (a negative sign). In the empirical analysis we test for symmetry of the matrix Λ. We impose symmetry if symmetry is not rejected. In the special case that all off-diagonal elements of Λ are equal to zero we may as well estimate employment equations for each age group separately.
The vector of control variables, ct X , includes the logarithm of the real wage rate per hour, the logarithm of the real gross domestic product per capita, age group specific population shares (ages 15-24, 25-54 and 55-64) , the logarithm of average hours of work per week and the share of female employment in total employment. A trend term is included in all equations.
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As mentioned in Section 2, all variables used in the analysis are non-stationary in levels but stationary in first differences. We therefore estimate equation (3) in first differences. This also implies that the country specific fixed effect c α is eliminated. We estimate the model, i.e. equation (3), in two steps. In the first step we estimate each of the three reduced form employment equations of the model using the Instrumental Variable estimator proposed by Anderson and Hsiao (1982) . 4 We improve upon the efficiency by using an optimal weighting matrix. Most of the explanatory variables discussed above are plausibly endogenous and for this reason all of them are instrumented. In the second step we use a Minimum Distance
Estimator to obtain estimates of Λ and Ф (see, e.g., Kodde, Palm and Pfann, 1990) .
The set of instruments used in the first step consists of lags of both dependent and independent variables of the model. Variables used to form additional instruments are the population shares of individuals under 15 and over 64, and unemployment of the population aged 15-64. The model is estimated in first differences. Under the assumption of no autocorrelation, variables that are lagged at least two periods can be used as instruments. We use lags five, four, three, and two. To validate this choice an over-identification test is carried out to test the null-hypothesis that the instruments and the error term are independent. Furthermore we test for serially uncorrelated error terms. The null-hypothesis of the autocorrelation test is that there is no second order autocorrelation in the first-differenced error term. Table 2 reports the estimation results of the model outlined in Section 3.1. Before turning to the estimation results we briefly discuss the model specification tests reported in the bottom panel of Table 2 . In the discussion below we adopt a 5% level of significance. The three overidentification tests, one for each reduced form employment equation, do not reject exogeneity of our instruments. 5 The three autocorrelation tests do not reject the null of no serial correlation.
Estimation Results
Furthermore, we do not reject symmetry of the matrix Λ.
The empirical results in Table 2 do not support the hypothesis that employment of younger and older people are substitutes and even show some minor complementarities of employment in the 4 See Bond (2002) for a review of estimators for dynamic panel data models. 5 We have also tested whether or not the instruments have sufficient explanatory power (see Bound, Jaeger and Baker, 1995 The effects of the wage rates and GDP per capita are as expected, though not all wage effects are statistically significant. An increase in the wage rate results in a decrease in employment, while economic growth is good for employment. An increase in the (age specific) population results in an increase in employment. The share of female employment has no significant effect on employment. An increase in the hours of work per week results in a significant increase in employment for the younger and older people.
Conclusions
Our empirical analysis does not support the hypothesis that employment of the young and old are substitutes and finds some minor complementarities of employment in the different age groups.
Changes in employment of older people aged 55-64 have small but positive effects on employment of the younger people aged 16-24 and on the prime age people aged 25-54. As discussed by Acemoglu (2002) , the last half century has been characterized by a continuing growth in the level of skill of new workers, type of skill requirements, and technological change that has been skill biased. This may have resulted in groups of younger and older worker that are very poor substitutes.
From a policy point of view these findings suggest that the policies during the 1970s and 1980s aimed at facilitating early retirement have been ineffective as instruments for reducing youth unemployment. This also suggests that the u-turn of policy makers nowadays to discourage early retirement will have no adverse effects on youth employment. 15 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 
